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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43626 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-6243 
      ) 
SUSAN K. MOTTAZ,   )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________ ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Susan Mottaz was sentenced to a unified term of eight years, with two years 
fixed, after pleading guilty to one count of domestic violence, having a prior felony 
conviction for domestic violence within fifteen years.  She contends the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors 
that exist in this case. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 On April 30, 2015, Ms. Mottaz had an argument with her husband and bit him on 
the hand, leaving bite marks.  (7/29/15 Tr., p.21, L.21 – p.22, L.17.)  Ms. Mottaz called 
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the police to report the incident and was arrested.  (Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSI”), p.3.)  She was charged by Information with one count of domestic violence, 
having a prior felony conviction for domestic violence within fifteen years.  (R., pp.50-
51.)  Ms. Mottaz pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.  (R., pp.54-60.)  Although the 
parties agreed to mental health court, Ms. Mottaz was determined to be ineligible, and 
the case proceeded in the district court.  (R., p.56; PSI, pp.30-31; 10/2/14 Tr., p.24, 
Ls.18-21.)   
The district court sentenced Ms. Mottaz to a unified term of eight years, with two 
years fixed.  (R., p.81.)  The district court retained jurisdiction for a period of 365 days 
and recommended that Ms. Mottaz participate in a mental health rider and undergo a 
neuropsychological evaluation.  (R., pp.81-82.)  The judgment was entered on 
October 5, 2015.  (R., pp.80-84.)  Ms. Mottaz filed a timely notice of appeal on 




Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms. Mottaz, a unified 
sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, in light of the mitigating factors that exist 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Ms. Mottaz, A Unified 
Sentence Of Eight Years, With Two Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That 
Exist In This Case 
 
Ms. Mottaz asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of eight 
years, with two years fixed, is excessive.  Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the 
district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating 
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that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting 
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court exercises its 
discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).  “A sentence is reasonable if it 
appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to 
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  “When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will 
make an independent examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)). 
The sentence the district court imposed upon Ms. Mottaz was not reasonable.  
The first factor for this Court to independently examine is the nature of the offense.  See 
Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.  Ms. Mottaz called the police after she bit her husband during 
the course of an argument.  (PSI, p.126.)  The bite did not break the skin, but did leave 
bite marks.  (7/29/15 Tr., p.21, L.21 – p.22, L.17.)  Ms. Mottaz was 64 years old at the 
time of the offense and had been married to her husband for 27 years.  (PSI, pp.1, 21.)  
Ms. Mottaz had not been drinking alcohol or using any illegal substances.  (PSI, pp.11, 
21.)  When asked during the domestic violence evaluation how she felt about the 
incident, she stated, “I’m sorry.  I’ve been sorry for months and months and months.  I 
feel really bad about it.  I’ve told my husband too.”  (PSI, p.24).  At sentencing, 
Mr. Mottaz testified that he and his wife “are in love with each other” and that he and his 
son want her to come home. (10/2/15 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9).  This is not the type of crime 
that warrants a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed. 
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The second factor for this Court to independently examine is the character of the 
offender.  See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.  Ms. Mottaz is not the type of offender who 
warrants a sentence of incarceration of any length.  Ms. Mottaz was abused as a child 
and has a history of depression and suicide attempts.  (PSI, pp.40-41.)  Despite these 
challenges, she worked as a registered nurse for over 30 years and is a breast cancer 
survivor.  (PSI, pp.21, 475.)  Most significantly, it appears that Ms. Mottaz was and is 
suffering from a “mild neurocognitive defect . . . involving executive functioning or frontal 
abilities.”  (PSI, p.61.)  This was the conclusion reached by Dr. Craig Beaver, who 
performed a forensic mental health examination on Ms. Mottaz prior to sentencing.  
(PSI, pp.51-67.)  Dr. Beaver’s examination of Ms. Mottaz highlights the 
unreasonableness of the sentence imposed. 
Dr. Beaver diagnosed Ms. Mottaz with bipolar disorder, borderline personality 
disorder, and an “[u]nspecified neurocognitive disorder with behavioral disturbance.”  
(PSI, pp.63-64.)  Dr. Beaver described Ms. Mottaz’s functional impairment as follows: 
[T]he combination of her frontal/executive dysfunction and a borderline 
personality style creates significant issues for her.  I am concerned this 
combination results in her having limited capacity to control her anger and 
at times her behavior.  Unfortunately if her dementia is progressive, this 
pattern may accelerate over time.  Additionally, her bipolar disorder, when 
it is not properly treated, also likely worsens this circumstance 
considerably.  I suspect some of the acting-out episodes occurred within 
the context of her fluctuating mood disorder.  
 
(PSI, p.64.)  Dr. Beaver concluded that Ms. Mottaz’s personality issues are likely to 
become “more readily apparent and dysfunctional” and expressed “doubt[ ] . . . that 
further incarceration time will have much of a limiting impact on some of the behavioral 
concerns of Ms. Mottaz.”  (PSI, pp.62-63, 65.)   
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There is every indication that prison time has not and will not serve as a deterrent 
to Ms. Mottaz, and has not and cannot rehabilitate her.  At sentencing, Ms. Mottaz’s 
counsel informed the district court that Ms. Mottaz “has had a very, very hard time at the 
jail” and “really just wants to go home and be with her family again.”  (10/2/15 Tr., p.16, 
Ls.9-16.)  Ms. Mottaz told the district court, “I know there’s something wrong with me.  
I’ve been trying for years to get that changed.  And I’ve been to prison; it doesn’t do me 
any good.”  (10/2/15 Tr., p.19, Ls.8-11.)  The district court acknowledged at sentencing 
that “this is not an appropriate case for simply imposing sentence without some other 
alternative.”  (10/2/15 Tr., p.28, Ls.16-19.)  It thus ordered Ms. Mottaz to participate in a 
rider.  (10/2/15 Tr., p.28, Ls.22-24.)  The fact that the district court ordered Ms. Mottaz 
to participate in a rider does not make the sentence imposed reasonable considering 
Ms. Mottaz’s character and, in particular, her progressively worsening neurocognitive 
deficits.  She is in need of long-term mental health care, not incarceration. 
The third factor for this Court to independently examine is the protection of the 
public interest.  See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.  Dr. Beaver concluded that Ms. Mottaz 
does not pose a significant risk to the general public and “does not have a history of 
being violent in the community.”  (PSI, p.65.)  Ms. Mottaz does, however, present a high 
risk of future violence towards her husband.  (PSI, pp.27, 65.)  Dr. Beaver speculated 
that “unless [Ms. Mottaz] gets more intensive mental health services and remains 
stabilized on medication, she will continue to episodically make suicidal gestures and 
have some behavioral-control issues.”  (PSI, p.65.)  Ms. Mottaz’s husband nonetheless 
asked the district court to release her and let her come home.  (PSI, p.29.)  He 
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explained in a letter to the district court, “We still . . . love each other and want a chance 
to get this right for her and myself and [our son], one more time.”  (PSI, p.29.)   
There is no indication that Ms. Mottaz is receiving intensive mental health 
services and stabilizing medication while on her rider.  The sentence imposed by the 
district court is thus not likely to prevent any future problems, but just delay them.  
Ms. Mottaz is mentally ill, with a condition that appears likely to progress.  As 
Ms. Mottaz’s attorney explained at sentencing, “[S]ending [Ms. Mottaz] to prison is [not] 
going to help anyone.  It’s not going to help society.  It’s not going to help [Ms. Mottaz].  
She will end up just, essentially, rotting away in our state correctional facility . . . .”  
(10/2/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.18-24.)  In light of these mitigating factors, and notwithstanding 
the aggravating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court was not reasonable 




Ms. Mottaz respectfully requests that the Court reduce her sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 3rd day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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